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1. INTRODUCTION
This study addresses an interesting issue related to federalism - regions’ activism in the international arena. The phenomenon is often called “paradiplomacy” 
and is quite well researched, as recently many subnational 
units have kept a high profile and played an important role 
in transnational relations, mainly economic and cultural. We 
use the case of  Iraqi Kurdistan (IK), which is a federal region 
within the newly created Iraqi federation. This study is an 
attempt to add to the literature on federalism, secession and 
subnational units’ involvement in global politics using an 
interesting empirical case.
1.1. The Problem and Rationale
The concept of  paradiplomacy has appeared in literature 
quite recently because scholars were more interested in 
sovereign states’ foreign policy, while the international 
activities of  federal regions and other sub-state units have 
been of  lesser interest to scholars and practitioners. This 
study focuses mainly on paradiplomacy and the main 
motivations behind practicing it, taking cues from Keating’s 
conceptual framework of  the economic, social, and political 
motivations of  such activities.
One of  the continuous problems in the Middle East is the 
unresolved Kurdish question and the Kurds’ dissatisfaction 
with their status of  being a stateless nation. In the past three 
decades, particular scholarly attention has been paid to IK, 
which already enjoys significant autonomy within Iraq’s 
loose federation. The Iraqi Kurds’ determinations to gain 
recognition and respect from the international community, 
which they believe they deserve, are one of  the self-assumed 
missions of  the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 
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The KRG has purposefully worked on this matter since the 
fall of  the Baath regime in 2003. The Kurdish authorities 
and the representatives of  the regional government abroad 
have played an important role in reaching out to the outside 
world and gaining a measure of  international recognition. 
In August 2014 with the attacks by ISIS on Kurdistan and 
an ensuing successful fight against the militants by the 
Peshmerga (Kurdish armed forces), the Kurds gained even 
more international sympathy and appreciation. Today the 
question is no longer about the international community’s 
awareness of  the existence of  the Kurds as the world’s largest 
stateless nation, but about gaining support for their would-be 
sovereign state.
Hence, the broad theoretical problem this study addresses 
is the breakup of  federations and secessionist movements 
facilitated by paradiplomacy. This paper focuses on KRG 
activism in the international arena as a strategy to achieve 
international recognition of  a would-be independent 
Kurdistan.
1.2. Our Argument
Although various scholars entertain different views on 
paradiplomacy’s causes and effects, there is no study, to 
the best of  our knowledge, dedicated to paradiplomacy 
used as a tool for achieving independence. We argue that 
paradiplomacy has been used by the KRG as an effective 
tool to facilitate secession from the Iraqi federation.
To test our argument, we generated primary data through 
in-depth interviews with KRG officials, Kurdish politicians 
and intellectuals and relied on secondary data, such as official 
documents, websites, newspaper reports, statistics, and public 
speeches.
The study has some limitations due to the sensitivity of  the 
subject and the time constraints; plus, only a small number of  
participants were available for interviews. The timeframe of  
this study is limited to the period starting from 2005, when the 
federal system was introduced in Iraq, to the independence 
referendum of  September 2017.
2. THEORETICAL-EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK
In 1945 when the United Nations was created, there were only 
51 members. Eventually, this number increased over the time 
to reach 193. Many, currently, sovereign states were colonies 
or parts of  larger countries. The Post-Cold War International 
System has undergone further serious transformations. The 
USSR split into many states. The latest independent state, 
South Sudan was admitted to the United Nations on July 
9, 2011.
Scholars argue that changes in international politics, globalization 
and the end of  Cold War created circumstances conducive to self-
determination and state building (Hehir and Robinson, 2017), 
but independence still needs the international community’s 
approval. To become sovereign, an aspirant must be recognized 
by the international community and therefore accepted in the 
club of  sovereign states (Griffith, 2017). Many ethnic minorities 
within larger countries aspire to achieving independence; over 
10 of  them have become sovereign states during the past 
20 years (Feniman, 2013). There are four elements necessary for 
statehood: Population, territory, government, and sovereignty 
(Chanhchom, 2010). The Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) has 
already some attributes of  statehood, such as territory, common 
history and culture, language and a sense of  community. What 
missing is sovereignty, and that is exactly what the IKR aims 
to gain (Croatia, 2007).
Seeking independence becomes an option for various 
groups of  people who are different from the titular nation 
ethnically, religiously, and ideologically. This might lead to 
conflict and the use of  force (Goldesten and Pevehouse, 
2012). There are a few important factors that typically speed 
up the process of  acceptance into the club of  sovereign 
states - suppression of  the national identity and economic 
exploitation, as well as an abundance of  natural resources 
and a high profile in the international arena. Paul emphasizes 
the importance of  having a sort of  diplomatic relations in 
order for a breakaway entity to become independent. He 
says, “diplomatic recognition confirms legitimacy on a new 
state, but sometimes there is divided consensus within the 
international community” (Paul, 1996. p. 8).
As there is no readily available theoretical framework that 
could help us to adequately understand a substate’s behavior 
in this respect, we will significantly draw on the writings of  
Keating, who argues that paradiplomacy is used for three 
distinct reasons by actors at the su state level: Economic, 
social, and political. We also use Andre Lecour’s insights 
into the aims of  paradiplomacy: To create an “international 
personality” that can serve various purposes.
For many, the concept of  paradiplomacy is new and derives 
from the concept of  diplomacy. With some similarity, the two 
terms have different meanings. Each refers to a different type 
of  relationship in the international relation. Satow defines 
diplomacy as:
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The application of  the intelligence and the tact to the conduct 
of  official relations between the governments of  independent 
states, or more briefly the conduct of  business between states 
by peaceful means (Satow, 2009).
He argues that only the central government of  a sovereign 
state can use diplomacy and have diplomatic relations with 
other states. The term “paradiplomacy” was first used in 
the 1980s in Canada and the USA. The scholar who coined 
the name was Soldatos who reduced the phrase “parallel 
diplomacy” to paradiplomacy (Soldatos, 1990). For Aldecoa 
and Keating paradiplomacy is “the foreign policy of  non-
central governments” (Aldecoa and Keating, 2000), while 
Berridge defined it as:
In general, activity analogous to diplomacy conducted by 
anyone without diplomatic status, in particular, a member of  
a nongovernmental organization or private individual acting 
independently, specifically international activity by regional 
governments such as the Canadian province of  Quebec and 
the stateless nations such as the Kurds (Berridge and Alan, 
2003).
Some scholars refer to the term as “a direct international 
activity by subnational actors, supporting, complementing, 
correcting, duplicating, or challenging the nation state’s 
diplomacy.” (Bursens and Jana, 2010) Duchacek suggested 
using “microdiplomacy” instead (Duchacek, 1990). In this 
study, by paradiplomacy we mean a direct interaction and 
political activities of  sub-states units in the international 
arena, quite in line with Wolff ’s definition:
The capacity of  sub-state entities’ participation independent 
of  their metropolitan state in the international arena in the 
pursuit of  their own specific international interests.”
In other words, paradiplomacy is the involvement of  
substates or regions in international relations with specific 
agendas that serve their interests (Wolf, 2007).
In the new era of  globalization, regions’ activities have 
become rather common and play a noticeable role. In normal 
situations, countries are committed to the Westphalian 
concept of  state where the state has the highest authority 
(D’Anieri, 2010). Obviously, paradiplomacy seems to 
undermine the traditional understanding of  global politics 
as the interaction of  states only.
It is not always clear what paradiplomacy entails and serves 
to achieve. Some argue that substates are active in the 
international arena to achieve their hidden agenda. Aguirre 
claims that paradiplomacy goes “beyond diplomacy and 
that is due to the fact region’s interest do not go side by side 
with the federal government’s interests” (Aguirre, 1999. 
p. 205) The classical examples of  substates engagement in 
paradiplomatic activities are Quebec, the Basque country 
and federal regions in Belgium; today, there are other similar 
examples, such as the UK, Spain, Germany, China, Italy, 
Japan, Austria, Argentina, Russia, and Mexico (Setzer, 2013). 
Practicing paradiplomacy by sub-states has various reason 
and motivations, which can be summarized as economic, 
cultural, and political (Keating, 2000). Lecours calls them 
“layers.” The first layer relates to economic issues; regions 
or substates work for an international presence to attract 
external investments and promote trade. The second layer 
is social, cultural, educational, scientific, and technical 
cooperation. While the third layer, political considerations, 
where the substate works to assert its national character 
and achieve political autonomy (Lecours, 2008. p. 5). Wolff, 
justifying sub-states interests in international relations, claims 
that regions and sub-states practice paradiplomacy to solve 
conflict relating to self-determination:… should be embraced 
as a necessity and opportunity in the process of  managing 
and ultimately resolving what might otherwise be protracted 
conflicts ” (Wolf, 2007).
In Paradiplomacy and Stateless Nations, André Lecours and 
Luis Moreno claim that “paradiplomacy serves as a means 
for identity and nation-building; that it sustains and promotes 
specific interest definitions such as cultural preservation; 
and that the intergovernment conflicts it involves provide 
opportunities for political-territorial mobilization (Lecours 
and Moreno, 2001).
Keating argues that most of  the regions and substates 
with national aspirations use paradiplomacy to pursue 
their political goals and fulfill their nationalistic dreams of  
statehood and sovereignty. Quite often, it is indeed used 
as a strategy to achieve recognition beyond the status of  
a minority region without raising suspicions of  separatism 
(Keating, 2000).
Paradiplomacy is also used outright to gain independence, 
to prepare the international opinion and have support from 
countries that might grant recognition when independence is 
actually declared. Catalonia is one of  the most active regions 
that promote itself  internationally with a view to gaining 
independence from Spain. In 1992 and during the Olympic 
Games, the government of  Catalonia used a smart strategy 
to promote the region by placing an ad in English asking 
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“Where is Barcelona?” driving the reader to rethink about 
the answer they know, and clarifying that it is in Catalonia, 
not Spain. Keating strongly believes that nationalism is one 
of  the strongest motivators of  sub-states paradiplomacy, 
while Lecours adds that those substates aim at creating an 
“international personality,” to maintain a high profile in the 
global arena.
Scholars agree that substates are active in the international 
arena in pursuit of  specific interests although they are 
expected to operate in collaboration with the central or 
federal government (Keating, 2000). Quite often, they pursue 
pure political goals that might defy the central government: 
Creating “international personality,” asserting their distinct 
ethnic identity and seeking recognition (Wolf, 2007). Paquin 
and Lachapelle claim that when regions are deprived of  their 
rights and unable to pursue their interests due to the absence 
of  sovereignty, they tend to walk away out from under the 
central government’s umbrella (Stephane and Guy, 2005).
Sub-states that are active in the international arena quite 
often entertain long-term plans of  secession. Baalthazar 
suggests distinguishing protodiplomacy, which is harmful 
to the federal relationship, from paradiplomacy, regional 
international activism in line with the federal government 
foreign policy and is not aimed at secession. Baalthazar 
argues that protodiplomacy means the diplomatic efforts of  
representatives of  sub-state entities that seek recognition for 
an eventual sovereign state (Balthazar, 1999. p. 162). In this 
study, we embrace Keating’s conceptual framework and use 
the term “paradiplomacy” that encompasses all international 
activities by subnational units, be they economic, sociocultural 
or political steps aimed outright at secession.
2.1. IK, a Brief Background Note
After the collapse of  the Ottoman and Persian Empires, the 
Western powers fractured them, and the current Middle East 
is essentially the result of  this partition. In the beginning of  
the 20th century, the Kurds were promised an independent 
state, but their hopes were dashed in 1923 when the Treaty 
of  Lausanne was signed. The Kurds became the victim of  
this division separated in four countries - Turkey, Iraq, Iran, 
and Syria (Nezan, 2017). Despite this division, the Kurds 
have preserved their unique culture, language, and identity.
The US invasion of  Iraq in 2003 offered an exceptional 
opportunity for the Kurds who perceived it as it as more 
of  “liberation” than “invasion.” They welcomed the US 
troops and proved their trustworthy allies (Cockburn, 2013). 
After the collapse of  the Baath regime, the new central 
government was busy rebuilding Iraq, while the Kurds were 
a decade ahead in state-building, as they had developed their 
governmental institutions since the introduction of  the no-
fly security zone in 1991. At the same time, they actively 
participated in drafting the Transitional Administrative Law 
and the 2005 constitution and decided to stay within a new 
federal Iraq (Phillips, 2015).
3. KURDISTAN’S PARADIPLOMACY: EMPIRICAL 
OBSERVATIONS
Only a few solid scholarly works are dedicated to Kurdish 
paradiplomacy. Stefan Wolf  argues that the Iraqi constitution 
has various gaps concerning the federal relationship as well 
as the region’s rights to engage in foreign relations (Wolf, 
2010). Hence, based on the provided literature, there are 
different views on paradiplomacy, its aims, goals and its 
effectiveness. On the other hand, Danilovich argues that the 
regional paradiplomatic activities of  Kurdistan “desire to 
assert national identity at home and abroad, not to secede.” 
He believes that the region has decided to live under the Iraqi 
flag. However, it practices its diplomatic activities only to 
gain recognition from outside, not to demand independence. 
Furthermore, he adds that the Iraqi constitution does not 
grant the right to secession from the federation (Danilovich, 
2014).
Only after the enactment of  the Iraqi constitution in 2005, 
the KRG practically became a federal region. It started 
working out some important aspects of  domestic policy 
and eyeing the international arena as well. In 2006, the KRG 
established a Department of  Foreign Relations headed by 
an official at a ministerial rank. In order not to irritate the 
federal government, a more indirect title such as head of  
the department has been used (Bengio, 2012. p. 299-308).
The Department’s mission is to conduct relations with 
the outside world. It is considered an essential unit of  
the KRG cabinet. The DFR is responsible for building 
relations with the international community, promoting trade, 
attracting investment, tourism, and maintain institutional 
ties with foreign countries. The DFR supervises the IKR’s 
representations abroad and also coordinates relations between 
the KRG and the central government in Baghdad and has 
its representation in Baghdad (Bengio, 2012). On the other 
hand, there are over 40 international representations in the 
Region, such as consulates, embassy branches, international 
organizations, and trade offices.
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3.1. Department of Foreign Relations: KRG Instrument 
of Paradiplomacy
Since the establishment of  the Department of  Foreign 
Relations in 2006, Falah Mustafa has been its permanent 
head. However, only in 2012, he was invited to attend cabinet 
meetings (Mustafa and Huda, 2017). Minister Mustafa 
described the mission of  his department as follows:
No friends, but the mountains proverb pretty much had 
shaped our policies in the past; we were isolated and 
we needed to break that isolation. We faced animosity 
and confrontation and we needed to turn them into to 
cooperation (interview).
Interestingly, both Falah Mustafa, head of  the DFR and 
Aladdin, Director of  the Middle Eastern Research Institute, 
stated that what the KRG practices is not “paradiplomacy,” 
but real diplomacy. Mustafa stated “We may have started with 
paradiplomacy or public diplomacy, but now we are acting 
and functioning as a part of  the government. We are not 
lesser than any other ministry” (Mustafa and Huda, 2017).
Originally, the DFR was established to be a bridge between 
the region and Baghdad. Then its role expanded to social, 
commercial, and cultural cooperation with the international 
community. It is important to mention that the DFR was 
not formed immediately after the adoption of  the Iraqi 
constitution in 2005; the KRG realized that it was important 
to have a department to promote the region’s interests within 
Iraq and abroad. The DFR has significantly expanded its 
relations with various countries around the world both by 
establishing its representations abroad and receiving foreign 
representations in the region.
The DFR has three main objectives. First, to promote and 
protect the interests of  the IKR in the world. Second, to 
develop and encourage important political and economic 
relations with the international community, particularly with 
neighboring countries. Furthermore, the DFR provides 
effective legal and consular services to foreign citizens in the 
region (Mustafa and Huda, 2017). The DFR has the following 
stated functions:
• Strengthening relations with the international community,
• Promoting trade, investment, tourism, and institutional 
ties,
• Supervising the KRG’s offices overseas,
• Liaising with the diplomatic community in the Kurdistan 
region,
• Organizing visits of  political and economic delegations 
to the Kurdistan Region, coordinating, and organizing 
KRG relations with the Iraqi Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 
and Iraqi embassies abroad,
• Conducting and supporting activities that enhance the 
image of  the Kurdistan region abroad,
• Providing legal and authentication services to the people 
of  the region and its citizens abroad (DFR Official 
Website, 2017).
The DFR has seven offices, each in charge of  one specific 
task: (1) The Office of  International Relations facilitates 
activities of  foreign diplomatic representations in the IKR, 
organizes visits of  foreign delegations, as well as promotes 
the KRG’s relations with their respective countries. (2) An 
office that deals with the KRG representations abroad. 
(3) The third is the Protocol Office. It also liaises with 
the federal Ministry of  Foreign Affairs in Baghdad and 
federal bureaus in the region. (4) The fourth is the Office 
of  International Organizations, such as United Nations 
agencies and international NGOs operating in the Region. 
(5) The fifth is the Legal Office, which certifies and validates 
documents relating to foreign consulates in the IKR. (6) The 
sixth is the Media and Communication Office, responsible 
for dissemination of  the KRG’s messages; it works closely 
with the foreign press in the region and maintains the DFR 
official website. (7) The last unit is the Office of  Human 
Resources and Finances (KRG-DFR Official Website, 2017).
3.2. Hosting Foreign Representations
Since its establishment, the KRG has started building bridges 
with the outside world. The Russian consulate was the first 
to open in Erbil. To date, there are 35 countries that have 
their representations in the IKR at the level of  consulates, 
embassy branches, and honorary consuls. This also includes 
commercial representations of  many countries, Iran, Russia, 
Germany, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Jordan, Egypt, the Czech Republic, Hungary, China, 
Italy, India, Saudi Arabia, Netherlands, Kuwait, Sudan, and 
Korea. In addition, there are six honorary consuls - Spain, 
Japan, Denmark, Belarus, Slovakia, and Brazil. The EU 
has a liaison office. International organizations, such as 
Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Korea 
International Cooperation Agency, UNAMI regional 
representation office, the International Committee for 
Red Cross, and United Nations Mission to Iraq have their 
representatives in the region (DFR Official Website and 
Mustafa, 2017).
Opening consulates in Erbil were the start of  significant 
developments in Kurdistan’s relations with the outside 
world. Turkey, one of  the IKR’s most significant neighbors, 
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established its consulate in 2010. Obviously, foreign countries 
establish their diplomatic representations in the IKR as part 
of  bilateral agreements with the Republic of  Iraq and with 
Baghdad’s consent, but their interest in having a foot in the 
Region stands as proof  of  Kurdistan’s rising international 
profile.
3.3. Reaching out to the World: KRG Representations 
Abroad
The KRG has 14 representative offices in following 
countries: Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, 
Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the 
USA, in addition to an office in the European Union. The 
KRG’s representations abroad constitute the main tool of  
its paradiplomatic activities (DFR, 2017).
It is fair to mention that the Kurdistan Region had its 
representatives in the UK and the USA even before the 
establishment of  federal Iraq; however, they represented 
two main political parties - the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
and the Patriotic Union of  Kurdistan. Since 2006, things 
have changed, and these party offices merged and work 
under the aegis of  the DFR. Hence, it can be said that only 
after the establishment of  the DFR, the KRG had a unified 
presence in the UK and the USA. The DFR took the lead 
in centralizing and regulating their activities and making sure 
that the representatives had a decent reputation and that the 
host countries knew that they represented the region, not 
political parties.
To further centralize the operations of  these offices and to 
well articulate the message to be carried to the outside world, 
the DFR organized in 2011 a series of  workshops attended by 
all KRG representatives. A political framework was worked 
out, the aims and responsibilities of  the representative offices 
were articulated and agreed on (KRG Official Website, 2017).
3.4. Diplomatic Marathon
One of  the main paradiplomatic efforts with significant 
political overtones is deployed through visits of  KRG top 
officials to foreign countries and foreign dignitaries, to the 
region.
In 2008, the KRG’s prime minister made few visits to Iran 
and Korea for political and economic purposes. Later in 2009, 
president Barzani visited Austria, Belgium and the institutions 
of  the European Union in his European tour. The main goal 
of  these visits was to build relations and ask for assistance 
in strengthening the Kurdistan Region’s judicial, health and 
educational systems. “We ask for your help in how we can 
build our institutions, good healthcare and education systems, 
create an independent judiciary and improve governance” 
(KRG Website, 2009). Same year, the KRG witnessed many 
historical visits from the Turkish Foreign Affairs minister, 
US Senator John McCain, US UN Ambassador Susan Rice, 
Secretary of  Defense Robert Gates, and US Vice President 
Joe Biden.
In 2012 Nechirvan Barzani, the KRG Prime Minister 
accompanied by a delegation attended the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) in Istanbul where he privately met with the 
Turkish prime ministers along with the foreign minister 
Davout Oglu. In 2013, President Barzani was invited to 
participate in WEF and he had various meeting with the 
Dutch prime minister Mrk Rutte, the Lebanese Prime 
Minister Miqati, a US congressional delegation headed by 
then - Majority Leader Eric Cantor, Switzerland’s State 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Yves Rossier and President 
of  the International Red Cross Peter Mauer to deliver a 
message of  Kurdish existence and struggle to stand on its 
feet. Barzani was praised for his economic policy and overall 
development of  the region (KRG, 2013). Furthermore, 
Barzani was invited for the second time to attend the WEF in 
2014 in Switzerland. Fuaad Hussain the KRG chief  of  staff  
stated that the invitation underscored “the significance of  the 
Kurdish region in world affairs” and he added, “This shows 
the political and economic development of  the Kurdistan 
Region, which has attracted the attention of  international 
centers at different levels” (Rudaw, 2014). Hence, this shows 
how far the KRG has come in practicing paradiplomacy to 
promote itself  and its economic success showing itself  as 
an investment hub.
The region paid serious attention to building relations with 
Arab countries; in 2010, the KRG received royalties from 
the UAE, Crown Prince and Ras al-Khaimah, as well as 
the Egyptian foreign minister. The biggest event in KRG’s 
Paradiplomatic activities in 2010 was President Barzani’s visit 
to the White House where he was welcomed by President 
Obama (KRG-DFR Website, 2017). Barzani’s visit can be 
considered historic because as the chairman of  the Kurdish 
Democratic Party, the ruling party in KRI, but still on the 
USA terrorist groups list. Furthermore, in February 2014 
Barzani refused to meet with President Obama again until 
his party alongside with the PUK was removed from the 
USA blacklist. On December 2014, US Congress officially 
decided to take both Kurdish parties off  the blacklist (Daily 
Sabah, 2014) Data show that only in 2010 the President, 
prime minister, senior officials effected more than 28 visits 
abroad. President Barzani alone made 14 visits and mission 
Danilovich and Abdulrahman: Aiming at Secession
UKH Journal of Social Sciences | Vol 1 • Issue 1 • 201754
same year to the US, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Arab 
League countries (El-Dessouki, 2010). Regionally, the KRG 
continued to strengthen its relations with the neighboring 
countries.
In 2011, the Turkish PM visited the capital of  Kurdistan to 
participate in the opening of  Erbil international airport as 
well as the Turkish consulate. When President Barzani visited 
Turkey and the city of  Diyarbakir, he was warmly welcomed; 
what is more, the hosts hoisted the Kurdish flag for the first 
time to emphasize the significance of  the visit and cooperation 
between both governments (Uras, 2013). In 2013, more 
than 175 international dignitaries, including high officials, 
ambassadors, ministers, and high ranking executives from 
various international organizations paid visits to Kurdistan. 
Through these visits the KRG marketed the region to the 
world as a model for the rest of  the Middle East and showed 
that the region successfully builds democracy, purposefully 
act to achieve stability, prosperity, promotes women’s rights, 
tolerance, civil society, and businesses (Mansour, 2015).
In 2015, Barzani visited Ankara to discuss cooperation with 
Turkey in fighting ISIS. It was the first time the Turkish 
PM received the KRG’s officials under the Kurdish flag 
(Abdulrazaq, 2011). This important symbolic gesture was 
made again in 2017 when President Barzani visited Turkey 
- the Kurdish flag was raised in Ataturk airport when 
welcomed by President Erdogan (Dolamari, 2014).
In 2015, President Barzani visited the White House for 
the second time and met with President Obama to discuss 
various issues related to the war on terrorism and improving 
communication with Baghdad and achieving stability in the 
country (Saeed, 2015). However, President Barzani and 
Kurdistan Prime Minister Nerchirwan Barzani repeatedly 
stated that they would not let Kurdistan to continue being 
dragged into Iraq’s endless problems and sectarian conflict. 
After recovering from the ISIS attack, Kurdish officials 
became inclined to think that Iraq today is not the Iraq of  
2003 when the Kurds were eager to help to build a new 
country. Now the country’s situation is deteriorating, and 
the federal government’s policies have been self-destructive.
4. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND KRG PARADIPLOMACY: 
ANALYSIS
In our interpretation of  the KRG’s paradiplomacy, we draw 
on Keating’s insights into the motivations behind sub-
state activism in the international arena by focusing on the 
three main motivations that drive regions’ paradiplomacy 
- economy, culture, and politics. We complement Keating’s 
framework by Lecour’s idea that regions attempt to create an 
international personality and thereby have a high international 
profile when the time comes for secession.
4.1. Economic Motivations
After the fall of  the Baath regime, Iraqi Kurds wanted to 
carve a wider niche in the new federation and become an 
important national player. At the same time, globalization 
has opened new horizons for federal regions, in particular, 
those with lavish natural resources. The KRG has opened 
up to foreign trade and welcomed businesses and investment 
by enacting liberal, business-friendly legislation. This has 
attracted foreign investors, in particular from the energy 
sector.
It is very beneficial for the developing sub-states and regions 
that are going through a political and economic transition 
to have connections and practice paradiplomacy with 
advanced industrialized states. This can provide them with 
different experiences in various aspects and create bridges 
for exchanging educational and investment opportunities, 
developing cultural programs (Lecours, 2008). Keating agrees 
with Lecours and affirms that in recent years economic 
factors became one of  the most important motivations of  
paradiplomacy. Due to economic transformations, regions 
are more involved in the international arena and enter the 
competition in the global market for broader investment 
opportunities (Keating, 2000).
One of  the most significant acts that opened the door 
to foreign investment was the enactment in 2006 of  the 
investment law and its massive advertisement through KRG 
representation abroad. This made a significant difference in 
the economy of  the region (Invest in Group Website, 2013). 
In 2006, the number of  British companies’ visits to the region 
was 5–7, but it dramatically increased by 2011 and reached 
70 visits by British companies’ representatives (KRG-UK). 
In November 2013, for example, an important delegation 
of  British businesspeople that included 50 companies in 
construction, oil and gas, healthcare and 13 universities paid 
a visit to Erbil (KRG-UK).
The KRG started to reach out to countries and attract their 
attention through available means, such as oil and gas. Barham 
Salih, former KRG PM, emphasized the importance of  the 
region’s natural resources to attract international investors and 
companies. Before 2003, the KRG had very little experience 
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in extracting oil and gas (KRG, 2010). Mustafa pointed out 
that the region started with its neighbors and among the first 
countries to deal with it was Turkey. Mustafa stated, “We 
have energy, and they need it” (Mustafa and Huda, 2017). In 
2009, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited 
the IKR with a delegation of  businessmen and officials to 
announce Turkey’s decision to open a consulate in Erbil 
(Morelli and Pischedda, 2014). Later, in October 2010 
the Turkish Republic opened a consulate general in Erbil. 
“We changed confrontation to cooperation,” said Mustafa 
(Mustafa and Huda, 2017). Due to the openness of  the region 
to trade and investment on one side and promoting attractive 
energy investment, many international oil companies found 
their way to the IKR. At present, there are 27 oil companies 
from 13 different countries that operate in Kurdistan. This 
includes energy giants, such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron, 
Gazprom, and Rosneft. Crude oil is exported through a 
pipeline from the region to Turkey’s Cihan port (Anadolu, 
2014).
When companies, such as Exxon Mobil, sign contracts with 
a region, like Kurdistan, it is “seen as a vote of  confidence” 
(Pfeifer, 2011). Foreign investments in the energy sector 
opened new opportunities for the KRI’s broader engagement 
with the international community.
The KRG uses its economic attractiveness to create a solid 
basis for establishing ties with foreign countries. In other 
words, the KRG uses its natural resources and business 
opportunities not only to build a strong economy but also 
to engage in political interaction with a view to gaining 
international support for possible secession.
4.2. Social and Cultural Motivations
One of  the highest aspirations any ethnic group entertains 
is the appreciation and recognition of  its identity, language, 
and culture. In an interview for the purpose of  this study, 
Falah Mustafa, the head of  the DFR, stated:
The paradiplomacy of  the KRG has many purposes and 
among these purposes is sharing our culture, our history and 
gain … empathy and support abroad. We want to make sure 
through our representatives abroad that crimes committed 
against the Kurds … we want to tell the world who the Kurds 
are (Mustafa and Huda, 2017).
He also added that the region wants to show the world how 
far it has come and how much it has achieved, and in order 
for Kurdistan to achieve more, it needs support from the 
international community.
We reached them out, we knocked on their doors, and we 
broke our isolation by taking part in different events and 
international festivals (Mustafa and Huda, 2017).
Hence, the KRG is trying to reach out to the international 
community for recognition through its culture, language, 
food, and identity. Keating points out that regions and 
large ethnic groups also seek recognition by taking part in 
international organizations, for example, UNESCO (Keating, 
1999). Therefore, Kurdistan started to renovate the Citadel, 
the vestige of  the most ancient history of  the region. After 
significant efforts deployed by the KRG, in 2014, the Citadel 
was formally added UNESCO’s list of  World Heritage sites 
(Neurink, 2016).
While promoting culture through paradiplomacy, the Kurds 
want to present themselves to the world as a modernized 
and developing nation. Despite all the challenges the KRG 
faces, it offers shelter to thousands of  refugees and IDPs. 
That is also a very strong message to the outside world. 
The KRG makes sure to show to the world that the Kurds 
are peaceful, tolerant, diverse, and hospitable. A significant 
number of  KRG officials use also social media to reach out 
to the world and share the Kurdish culture.
In other words, the KRG uses various methods and tools 
to promote its culture and assert its identity internationally.
4.3. Political Motivations
The economic and socio-cultural drives seem secondary and 
are part the KRG’s main goal to engage with the international 
community. Minister Mustafa unambiguously said that 
through economy and culture the KRG provides a basis for 
its political engagement with other countries: “Today when 
foreign dignitaries, high-ranking officials or politicians come 
to visit Iraq they have two places to go - first, Baghdad, 
second, Erbil” (Neurink, 2016).
As the Kurdistan Region decided on its own volition to 
stay with Iraq after 2003, it expected to be more involved 
in international affairs but did not have secession plans. 
After 2005, however, Baghdad was dragged into sectarian 
conflicts; the Shia-Sunni civil war has reached its highest 
level in 2014–2016 and even now does not seem to fully 
subside. Meanwhile, the Kurds stayed away from the sectarian 
hostilities, busied themselves building their nation and eyed 
the international community (Cockhurun, 2010).
After 2014 paradiplomacy activities intensified as a result 
of  ISIS’s threat. In a sense, the advent of  ISIS brought 
Danilovich and Abdulrahman: Aiming at Secession
UKH Journal of Social Sciences | Vol 1 • Issue 1 • 201756
the Kurdistan Region back into the spotlight of  the global 
media (Aladdin and Huda, 2017). Since ISIS posed a 
significant threat not only to the Middle East but also to 
global order, various countries showed support for the 
Region and the Peshmerga, its armed forces. ISIS’s direct 
confrontations with the Peshmerga presented an excellent 
opportunity to attract the international community’s 
attention to IK. The Kurdish question and the idea of  
self-determination came up naturally, as the Iraqi army 
failed to defend the Kurdish territory. It is interesting to 
note that ISIS invasion of  several other Iraqi provinces did 
not cause much of  the international community’s outcry. 
However, when the militants approached the Kurdistan 
region, the international reaction was well pronounced. The 
KRG estimated that the international community showed 
its particular interest in Kurdistan and its protection. 
Paradiplomacy seems to have paid a significant role in 
achieving this change of  attitude.
In 2014 the Peshmerga were the only forces on the ground 
fighting ISIS in the region; in addition, the KRG was engaged 
in an enormous humanitarian assistance campaign, hosting 
refugees from Syria and cities of  Iraq who fled to Kurdistan 
after ISIS captured their homes. As a result, various foreign 
governments dispatched delegations to the region. Even UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon paid a visit to the region; 
others followed suit - the foreign ministers of  Canada visited 
twice the region during that year, as well as the Ministers 
of  Foreign Affairs of  Germany, Italy, Czech Republic, UK, 
and France. French President François Holland also visited 
the region in September 2014. This diplomatic marathon 
continued in 2015 (DFR Website, 2017). This is something 
that had never happened before in the Kurdistan region’s 
history. The KRG perceived it as a clear sign of  how 
successful the KRG was to build good relations with the 
outside world (Mustafa and Huda, 2017).
In June 2014, the Peshmarga forces liberated Kirkuk city from 
ISIS occupation and established control over a significant 
part of  the oil-rich Kirkuk province, one of  the disputed 
territories claimed by both Erbil and Baghdad. In a joint 
news conference in Erbil with William Hague, the British 
foreign secretary, Barzani plainly announced that “Kirkuk 
is Kurdistan.” He went on, “We waited for 10 years for 
Baghdad to solve Article 140,” referring to the constitutional 
provision on the resolution of  disputed territories. “Now it is 
done because the Iraqi army pulled out and our Peshmerga 
forces had to step in. Hence, now, the problem is solved. 
There will be more no more conversation about it” (Abdel-
Hamid, 2014).
In its attempt to capitalize on obvious successes in the 
international arena, the KRG, led by President Barzani, 
launched a referendum of  independence in the region, 
including in the disputed territories liberated by the 
Peshmerga. In early April 2017, a joint high-level meeting of  
the two main parties, KDP and PUK, took place. The meeting 
was presided by President Masoud Barzani with the goal of  
holding a referendum this year. They discussed forming a 
joint committee to prepare for the referendum. During his 
meeting with the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, 
President Barzani stated that “Kurdistan Region will soon 
hold a referendum on independence to show the will of  the 
people to the world” (Bas News Website, 2017). This is well 
in line with Keating’s view that one of  the main political 
motivations for a region of  a sub-state entity to practice 
paradiplomacy is their aspiration toward statehood through 
preparing international opinion and seeking friends who might 
be potential supporters at an early stage (Keating, 1999).
After the decision to hold a referendum on independence 
was made, the DFR instructed its representatives abroad 
to publicize the idea of  Kurdish self-determination and to 
prepare the hosting countries for Kurdish independence: “We 
do not want to surprise them, said, Minister Mustafa, they 
must be prepared” (Mustafa and Huda, 2017).
While various scholars and analysts do not consider the 
KRG’s paradiplomacy as aiming at secession, our findings 
challenge this view and demonstrate that one of  the main 
underlying motives of  the KRG paradiplomacy is the political 
plan to break away from the Iraqi federation.
5. CONCLUSION
In this study, we attempted to explain how the activism in 
the international arena of  subnational units may be driven 
by secessionist intentions. The literature review helped us 
develop a theoretical explanatory framework that drew 
extensively on Keating’s and Lecours ideas which significantly 
guided us in this project.
We examined the motivations behind the KRG’s activism in 
the international arena and looked at its economic, social, 
and cultural, as well as political aspects. The KRG employs 
various tools for paradiplomacy: (1) The Department of  
Foreign Relations, (2) the KRG representative offices abroad, 
and (3) the foreign diplomatic missions in Erbil.
We argued that the KRG is driven in its international activism 
not so much by economic considerations and factors of  
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economic interdependence, but mostly by political motivations 
- preparing grounds for independence, making sure that the 
international community will be supportive when it happens.
Our findings show that the KRG does use paradiplomatic 
actions to pave the road for an independent Kurdish state. 
That is particularly evident from our analysis of  the DFR’s 
activities. Even when developing economic links, using 
natural resources, the KRG pursue its political agenda. 
Our findings also suggest that the KRG has significantly 
succeeded in its efforts in the international arena, as its 
officials are well respected by the international community 
and maintain good relations with the leaders with the world’s 
powerful countries, such as the US, UK, Turkey, and France.
Finally, our findings suggest that the direct statements on 
secession and self-determination of  Kurdistan and seceding 
from Iraq by the KRG President, Prime minister and the Head 
of  DFR, as well as many other officials is a clear sign of  the 
plans behind its paradplomatic activities. Our observations 
stand as proof  that the economic, social and cultural as well 
as political activities of  the KRG - all aimed at secession and 
securing international support. If  a subnational unit is extremely 
active in international relations, it most likely has secession in its 
plans. We hope that these findings are generalizable and thereby 
add to the literature and theory of  federalism and secession.
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